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 CN  Conclusion 
 CT  An Agenda for Research and Action 
We began this volume with three interrelated aims. First, there is the need to more 
closely integrate political theory on distributive justice matters into the study, 
critique, and reform of international economic law doctrine and institutions. The 
global justice debate has made it abundantly clear that the ready assumption that 
economic theory and political realism would together resolve all relevant normative 
issues in international economic law is now untenable (if it ever was tenable). 
Second, we recognize that political theory, for all its normative power, will 
ultimately fail to realize its full transformative potential without a more thorough and 
nuanced accounting of how institutions and rule systems – in all their messy human 
splendor – actually work. That is where justice will actually take place. Finally, we 
want to see how a closer conversation between international law and political theory 
might contribute to a clearer and more powerful analysis of global justice and its 
relationship to international economic law, thus strengthening both fields. 
In practice, this has resulted in a series of challenging and innovative papers – 
conversations, really – linked together by their cumulative exploration of the 
following questions: How can the justice of global economic relations be enhanced 
and safeguarded by international economic law? What substantive or procedural 
principles of justice should organize our efforts to improve the efficiency and social 
welfare of the international economic law system? What limits do we discover in 
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prevailing accounts of global justice when we explore their claims and implications 
through the complexity of international economic law systems as we find them? 
What limits within international economic law scholarship does the global justice 
debate highlight? 
The first section of the book advances several specific arguments on the 
nature of distributive justice and its relationship to global economic systems. Gould, 
Butt, and Hockett all offer egalitarian principles of justice, from within a broadly 
cosmopolitan perspective, and argue for their implementation through international 
law. 
This raises a fundamental question central to the project of this book: If we 
take both global justice and the complex, stubborn reality of international institutions 
and their politics seriously, how can we acknowledge the often radically egalitarian 
principles and implications of political theory in a way that offers practical, realizable 
guidance toward global justice? Our authors collectively identify and employ three 
different types of answers to this question. 
The first approach, employed by both Gould and Butt, is to offer a set of 
intermediate principles or mechanisms as bridging tools between political theory and 
institutional reality. For Gould, the key is human rights, but human rights understood 
as a set of benchmarks, prioritizing changes within domestic and international 
institutions rather than mandating radical redistribution. This results in a set of 
recommendations familiar to anyone conversant with the global justice literature, 
such as the use of human rights impact assessments, but with a difference. Instead of 
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a facile laundry list of changes, such prescriptions are grounded in a comprehensive 
theory of equal positive freedom, with human rights as an intermediate set of 
organizing principles rather than as an imagined shortcut to implementation. 
Similarly, Butt argues for a robust cosmopolitan principle – the principle of 
equality of opportunity – while fully recognizing the gulf between the implications of 
this theory and contemporary global socioeconomic reality. In Butt’s case, rather 
than offer human rights to bridge the gap, he suggests careful attention to three sets 
of intermediate issues critical to the implementation of any normative principles by 
actual institutions: their normative desirability, practicality, and popular legitimacy. 
Recognizing that the specific nature of distinct institutions, and the particular 
socioeconomic context of the people they affect, influences the sorts of actions that 
can and should be taken toward global justice at different levels, Butt reminds us that 
global equality of opportunity does not require equal material conditions, just the 
conditions of equal substantive opportunity in the relevant society. 
Thus we see two philosophers advocating ambitious theories, but within a 
framework that recognizes that implementation will be progressive, evolutionary, and 
grounded in the specific nature of actual institutions, the societies they affect, and the 
larger context of domestic and international politics. The corrective, if you will, 
against disengaged theorizing or facile prescription is through intermediate 
mechanisms – whether human rights principles or mediating concepts – that take into 
account the contextual reality of their target institutions. 
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Hockett, by contrast, offers us a different kind of corrective mechanism. He 
too pursues a broadly cosmopolitan principle of justice – that of fair distribution 
based on equal-opportunity-grounded welfare – but his focus is on the traps we create 
for ourselves within our own theoretical discourse. Arguing that all maximization 
models are distributive, equalizing–disequalizing, and reductive, but generally along 
the wrong criteria, he tries to make us self-conscious and critical of the assumptions 
in our formulae and their unexpected implications. The need for this kind of internal 
housecleaning for global justice theory may only become apparent as we try to apply 
it to concrete institutions and decisions. 
These three theorists all operate through the same basic structure: Develop the 
broadest, most powerful principle of justice you can, then work out the issues that 
arise when you proceed to argue for its implementation through law and institutions. 
Their contribution is to suggest mechanisms whereby the application can be more 
gradual, nuanced, and in keeping with institutional and political realities. In contrast, 
what if we approach the issue from an entirely different perspective, one that does 
away with the need for such complex attempts at mediation? What if we looked for 
principles of justice within the systems and institutions we are studying, instead of 
outside them? That is the premise behind James’ intriguing alternative approach to 
global justice theorizing offered in our fourth chapter. 
According to James, rather than engage in traditional political theory we 
should focus on internal principles of justice, namely principles tied to the internal 
structure of actual economic arrangements themselves. Within international 
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economic relations, he identifies internal principles of fairness, which he calls 
principles of structural equity. These internal principles of justice depend for their 
normative force on an underlying shared social practice of market reliance, rather 
than an overarching theory of distributive justice. The promise of this approach is 
that it does away with the need for intermediate mechanisms, because the theory 
comes from within the institutional arrangements themselves, thus improving the fit 
between theory and social reality. Insofar as it begins with a close analysis of the 
structure and operation of international economic law institutions themselves, James’ 
work is itself a type of bridge between the more explicitly normative offerings of the 
other theorists and the institutional context in which global justice reforms must 
occur. 
Taken together, the work of these four theorists suggests the need for more 
careful, formal attention to the relationship between normative theory and social facts 
from the theoretical side. In the case of external principles of justice, this can mean 
employing mediating structures such as human rights, but in a more nuanced or open 
structure as Gould does; or exploring in a philosophically rigorous manner the 
practical implications of mediating concepts, as with Butt’s account of popular 
legitimacy; or critically monitoring the institutional implications of our own 
theoretical language, as Hockett urges. Alternatively, one can follow James and 
locate the normative project entirely within the social context by seeking internal 
principles of justice and thereby obviating the need for mediation. Whatever 
approach one takes, what is essential is that theorists help do the extra work of 
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bringing their ideas across the practical threshold – it cannot be left solely to those 
approaching the issues from the institutional or doctrinal side. 
For their part, those coming from within the institutional perspective have 
their distinctive contribution to, and responsibility for, the overall success of the 
enterprise as well, as is typified by the authors in our second section. All three 
academic lawyers are, characteristically, deeply immersed in the nuanced 
particularity of international economic law and its institutions. Together, they raise a 
second fundamental question for this project: If we agree on the priority of global 
justice, what is the most effective way for us as theorists and lawyers to integrate the 
messy contingency of human life and political reality within our efforts to articulate 
and pursue normative aims in an institutional context? Too many theorists are content 
to resolve the matter with gestures toward “nonideal” conditions, and too many 
academic lawyers seem to disdain theory or mistakenly assume that facts can refute 
ideas. What distinguishes these three offerings from much other scholarship – in 
addition to their careful and sophisticated use of normative theory – is their shared 
assumption that the best normative analysis, and therefore the best avenue toward 
increased justice, is through this particularity, not over or around it. 
Drawing on a meticulous review of the debate over trade preferences, Lim 
argues that although moral claims within institutions are messy, complicated things 
that need different treatment than normative claims in ideal theory, with much more 
care taken to characterize their social, historical, and political context, they are moral 
claims nonetheless. Lim calls this “middle-level” theorizing, reminiscent of Blake’s 
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institutional theory.1 In contrast, Dunoff looks at the same debate and the same 
history but reaches opposite conclusions, questioning whether developing countries 
have in fact been making moral claims at all, or rather adopting strategic positions for 
historically contingent political and economic reasons. For Dunoff, arguments in 
favor of trade preferences should be evaluated empirically, strategically, and 
contextually, because what matters most is not the moral language in which a claim 
is made, but whether the sought-for policy actually works to achieve the stated goals. 
The dialogue between Lim and Dunoff reminds us that specific claims have 
specific histories and strategic implications in the fora within which they are raised, 
and they demand specific policy responses in those fora. Injustice takes place in 
specific concrete instances of time, place, and person, and so justice and the 
remediation of injustice must be similarly specific and grounded. Both Lim and 
Dunoff, in their different ways, agree that states’ moral claims are to be taken 
seriously, and that means contextually. And yet, we cannot easily dismiss the concern 
raised by Dunoff (echoing generations of realists) that states employ moral language 
for a variety of tactical reasons, and the mere use of moral language or justification 
should not settle any policy arguments. However, to remain with the example raised 
by both Lim and Dunoff, it cannot be that the simple existence of strategic realities 
affecting state positions with respect to trade preferences would by itself eliminate or 
render superfluous the moral claims that states do make, or (even more importantly) 
the moral significance of the positions they take. Our concern over the justice or 
injustice of the global trading system is not exhausted by the claims that states 
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happen to make or not make, nor is it settled by the concrete results states accept or 
contest. 
It is this process of claim, counterclaim, and contestation by states that is at 
the heart of Thomas’ contribution to the volume. Thomas argues that distributive 
justice is best approached through democratized governance procedures. She reminds 
us that the discourse of states in the WTO, like anywhere else, is complex and 
contradictory and makes broad substantive aims and programs difficult if not suspect. 
Add transaction costs and the reality of both policy differentiation among least 
developed countries and the proliferation of trade fora, and you get an idea of the 
complexity of the politics of trade and the coordination problems that states face. 
Adopting a procedural approach to substantive reform is one very lawyerly 
response to the complex realities Thomas catalogues. An intelligent use of historical 
and empirical data is another way to more effectively mesh theory with institutional 
reality, as both Dunoff and Lim suggest. Taken together, all three of our academic 
lawyers suggest a second important principle: When theorizing institutional reform, 
normative theory must undergo a “step change” or downshift if it is to effectively 
integrate with the very institutional realities it seeks to reform. This argues for a 
much more cautious and contextual approach to normative theorizing about 
institutional reform along global justice lines, reflecting both political theory and 
concrete differences in politics, resources, and conceptions of equality. 
All of this assumes that our normative language is an effective tool through 
which to identify injustice and prescribe remedies. This brings us to the third set of 
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contributors, each of whom in their different ways pose the third major question of 
this volume: Is the normative project of global justice as currently defined sustainable 
or even coherent? 
Tesón and Klick argue that much contemporary philosophy on the global 
justice question misses the mark on trade policy and distributive justice, because it 
ignores empirical reality in favor of ideal theory. Insofar as empirical work 
demonstrates that free trade is the most effective approach to alleviating world 
poverty, then free trade should be the policy prescription behind which all theories of 
global justice line up. The fact that it is not, and that free trade is often the target for 
global justice theorists, suggests to Tesón and Klick a dangerous level of confusion, 
disingenuousness, or worse. 
That “worse” is what Stark’s contribution is all about. She is deeply skeptical 
of the transformative capacity of contemporary global justice theory and its sincerity, 
but for different reasons. In her view, trade theory and international economic law 
cannot deliver justice because they are both fatally embedded in the neoliberal 
political, moral, and economic system, which is class based and essentially opposed 
to wealth redistribution. Moreover, the whole narrative of “development” is flawed 
for similar reasons. All a reformer can hope to do is expose these ideological 
constructs for what they are, opening up the possibility for something more honest to 
take its place. 
Trachtman also finds contemporary global justice theory to be lacking, but 
not on the basis of its ideological underpinnings. Instead, he analyzes the problem in 
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terms of the methodological limits of the discipline, leading philosophers to 
overpromise and the rest of us to overrely on normative theory beyond what it is 
capable of delivering. However, because all the other disciplines involved in the 
global justice inquiry – economics, law, and psychology to name three – have their 
own complementary blind spots, the solution when it comes to global justice lies in a 
consistent commitment to interdisciplinarity. In this way, each discipline working on 
global justice can support and reinforce the others. 
In an interesting way, the chapters in this section reflect three of the most 
salient positions on the larger debate concerning globalization itself. One tends to 
find that global opinion concerning the fairness problems in globalization divides 
itself into three camps. On one end of the spectrum, there are those who would agree 
with Tesón and Klick (Bhagwati foremost among them2) that the failures of 
globalization are attributable in large part to an inadequate commitment to liberalism 
– we need more free trade, not less, and the problem is well on the way to being 
solved. At the other end of the spectrum are those who would agree with Stark 
(Bourdieu is perhaps the most striking exponent3) that the problems of globalization 
cannot be fixed because globalization works exactly how those in power want it to, 
namely by enhancing the returns to capital on a global scale. In the middle are those 
of a more technocratic or policy-oriented nature (Stiglitz comes to mind4), who both 
see the problems and believe they can be fixed but would suggest (as does 
Trachtman) that it is a matter of “getting it right” – better policy can lead to fairer 
globalization. 
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Whatever one’s view of this globalization debate or the three contributions to 
this section, one can at least agree that they each offer important cautionary tales as 
we set about addressing the manifest suffering of the global many. Together, their 
injunctions constitute a third principal theme of this volume: When theorizing global 
justice and institutional reform, pay close attention to empirical theory, whatever one 
thinks of the politics associated with it; acknowledge the reality and limits of one’s 
own ideology and the pervasive effects of power inequalities; and avoid disciplinary 
hubris. 
This brings us to the conclusion of the conclusion. In our view the chapters in 
this volume underscore, despite their differences, that on matters of global justice our 
discourse is not so much confused with regard to what justice would look like, at 
least in its rough contours, as it is overwhelmed by the degree of injustice and the 
seeming intractability of current institutions and politics when it comes to real 
reform. Together, the offerings in this volume argue that rather than remain 
embarrassed at the audacity of the claims of justice, our often feeble responses, and 
the seeming impossibility of the obstacles, we can and should form a clear, coherent, 
and multidisciplinary agenda of research and action. 
First, we need several clear, powerful, well-argued principles or ideas that can 
inspire, animate, and organize our efforts toward a more just global economic 
system. This is the preeminent task of political theory. We need several of these 
ideas, not just one, because as Sen reminds us in The Idea of Justice, seeking a single 
triumphant idea of justice can be both a delusion and a dangerous distraction. When 
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over 26,000 children die each day, as Dunoff points out, we must move ahead as best 
we can with the tools we have. 
The theoretical contributions in this volume amply illustrate this potential and 
its realization. Both external and internal principles of justice all have a place in the 
larger normative conversation, each playing a vital role in generating important 
mutually reinforcing policy prescriptions – no comprehensive approach to global 
justice is complete without both approaches. Political theorists must examine, 
critique, and develop these ideas among themselves on the basis of a number of 
formal, aesthetic, and disciplinary criteria that are of fundamental importance to the 
quality and strength of their ideas, but that will never be a major preoccupation of 
academic lawyers and policy makers. 
Second, on the basis of such foundational principles, we need detailed 
intermediate models for reforming core rules, policies, and procedures in each key 
functional area of international economic law. Substantively, we need models and 
structures for the gamut of justice-oriented policy innovations affecting both 
substantive rules and legal process: mechanisms for universal welfare rights and 
benefits, transnational transfer payments, increased participation by least developed 
countries in governance and negotiation, representation of individuals in international 
economic governance, and basic procedural rights and safeguards, just to name a 
few. Formally, these models must draw equally on political theory, economic theory, 
and a nuanced understanding of the nitty-gritty reality of rules, systems of rules, and 
institutions. They should rely significantly on mediating concepts when based on 
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external principles of justice, or they should be closely related to internal principles 
of justice if one begins as James suggests. In either case, this is where academic 
lawyers and philosophers, together with economists, can have their most fruitful 
collaboration. Lim, Dunoff, and Thomas remind us of the complexity, contingency, 
indeterminacy, and contradiction inherent in human social activity, and that academic 
lawyers are fully capable of analyzing and managing this complexity – it is their 
strong suit. Essentially, there must be a collaborative effort among philosophers and 
academic lawyers for each major institution and area of international economic law, 
which may need revision in view of the demands of global justice. 
Third, on the basis of these ideas and these policy models, we need a wide 
range of legal arguments and an equally wide range of political strategies, addressed 
to each major country, each major institution, and each major stakeholder – as many 
arguments as possible and in the terms most persuasive with respect to that audience 
– in support of movement toward a more just global economic system. This is where 
philosophers and academic lawyers can work fruitfully with others such as political 
scientists and social psychologists interested in justice issues. 
The need for such arguments reflects the fundamental difference, albeit a 
mutually reinforcing one, between philosophy, law, and policy. All three involve 
arguments, but the arguments needed for political, legal, and economic reforms are of 
a different order than the arguments needed in theoretical discourse or in a court of 
law. They are not unrelated, but they are more cousins than siblings. If we are to 
move ahead in implementing the reforms that, by and large, we all agree on (even 
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communitarians acknowledge the most severe abuses and the basic shape of a 
response),5 then we need strategies to persuade (and hold accountable) the entrenched 
powers and interests that currently dictate the shape of global economic relations. 
Philosophers may be right about justice and lawyers may be right about 
institutionalized rules and power, but by themselves neither will be able to bring 
about any justice without a concerted effort to develop sophisticated, clear, and 
compelling arguments for political change (and accountability). Following 
Trachtman, we need the contributions of each discipline, united in a comprehensive 
policy package that can be delivered and implemented by political leaders. 
Together, this shapes a worthy research agenda for the next generation of 
global justice scholarship. 
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